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Abstract
Background: Wide-scale use of antiviral agents in the event of an influenza pandemic is likely to promote the emergence of
drug resistance, with potentially deleterious effects for outbreak control. We explored factors promoting resistance within a
dynamic infection model, and considered ways in which one or two drugs might be distributed to delay the spread of
resistant strains or mitigate their impact.
Methods and Findings: We have previously developed a novel deterministic model of influenza transmission that simulates
treatment and targeted contact prophylaxis, using a limited stockpile of antiviral agents. This model was extended to
incorporate subclinical infections, and the emergence of resistant virus strains under the selective pressure imposed by
various uses of one or two antiviral agents. For a fixed clinical attack rate, R0 rises with the proportion of subclinical
infections thus reducing the number of infections amenable to treatment or prophylaxis. In consequence, outbreak control
is more difficult, but emergence of drug resistance is relatively uncommon. Where an epidemic may be constrained by use
of a single antiviral agent, strategies that combine treatment and prophylaxis are most effective at controlling transmission,
at the cost of facilitating the spread of resistant viruses. If two drugs are available, using one drug for treatment and the
other for prophylaxis is more effective at preventing propagation of mutant strains than either random allocation or drug
cycling strategies. Our model is relatively straightforward, and of necessity makes a number of simplifying assumptions. Our
results are, however, consistent with the wider body of work in this area and are able to place related research in context
while extending the analysis of resistance emergence and optimal drug use within the constraints of a finite drug stockpile.
Conclusions: Combined treatment and prophylaxis represents optimal use of antiviral agents to control transmission, at the
cost of drug resistance. Where two drugs are available, allocating different drugs to cases and contacts is likely to be most
effective at constraining resistance emergence in a pandemic scenario.
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Introduction
Concerns regarding emergence of a pandemic influenza strain
have prompted the development of national and international
preparedness plans by governments and public health agencies. As
a key element of these plans, many developed nations have
acquired large stockpiles of antiviral drugs to be used for treatment
of infected individuals and for the containment and mitigation of
virus transmission. Antivirals may be deployed to curtail an
epidemic for sufficient time to allow development and deployment
of a targeted vaccine. In previous work, we developed a simple,
analytically tractable mathematical model to explore the likely
relative effects on epidemic dynamics of treatment and targeted
prophylaxis using a finite stockpile of such agents [1]. In keeping
with studies using computationally intensive individual-based
models, we concluded that, for the purposes of limiting spread,
prevention was better than cure [2,3].
Widespread use of antiviral drugs, however, has the potential to
promote emergence of resistant strains. The consistent conclusion
from models examining this issue [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] is that
relative fitness of mutant viruses is the key characteristic
determining their influence on epidemic dynamics and hence
antiviral effectiveness. Given that a high fitness cost has been
observed among most neuraminidase-inhibitor resistant influenza
strains to date [11] [12], this finding provides some reassurance for
health policy planners.
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 June 2008 | Volume 3 | Issue 6 | e2362The effect of differing patterns of drug use on emergence of
resistant viruses is more contentious. Depending on a range of
underlying assumptions including the characterisation of asymp-
tomatic individuals and population size, either treatment [4] [10]
or prophylaxis-based [5] [7] strategies were predicted as more
likely to select for resistant strains. In addition to incorporating the
likely development of resistance, we have explored in detail the
importance of infections attributed to asymptomatic individuals in
a large-scale population of 20 million people. We have further
considered how the strategic use of a finite stockpile containing
two antiviral drugs might minimise the emergence of resistance or
mitigate its negative effects during a pandemic, and suggest that
using separate drugs for treatment and prophylaxis might be an




model of influenza transmission has been described in detail
elsewhere [1]. A novel feature is the incorporation of a dynamic
‘contact’ label, applied to a fixed number of individuals drawn
from the whole population each time a new infectious case
appears. We define these contacts, based on the findings of
sociological studies, as those people who have been sufficiently
close to an infected individual to conceivably contract infection
[13] [14] [15], and so may be considered eligible for prophylaxis.
Infections can only occur in individuals who have been in contact
with a case, with the uninfected contacts, who comprise the
majority, returning to their original ‘non-contact’ status within a
matter of days.
Infectious duration
Considerable uncertainty exists regarding the maximal infec-
tiousness of individuals in relation to the symptomatic course of
influenza, although viral shedding data has been related to
infectious potential [16] [17]. We do not explicitly characterise
symptom onset in our model, but assume a one-day latent period
(E) between inoculation and the onset of three days’ constant
infectious duration (I), exponentially distributed over the period, of
which at least part of one day is likely to be presymptomatic.
Incorporation of asymptomatic infection
Comparison of disease and seroconversion rates in studies of
seasonal influenza demonstrates a high proportion of subclinical
episodes [18]. Historical cohort studies of influenza have
associated asymptomatic seroconversion with pre-season immuni-
ty, presumably derived from past infection with related viruses
[19]. Even for novel pandemic strains, evidence of long-lived
protection resulting from exposure to conserved viral antigens is
demonstrated by differential age-specific attack rates and relative
sparing of older age cohorts in historical reports [20] [21] [22].
Modelling studies of past pandemics suggest asymptomatic
infection may have accounted for one third to half of all infections
[23] [24]. To date, little evidence of asymptomatic seroconversion
has been demonstrated among close contacts of individuals
infected with H5N1 avian influenza [25] [26], but whether this
feature would be shared by a strain with pandemic potential
cannot be predicted. We therefore explore the sensitivity of model
behaviour to a range of assumptions regarding the symptomatic
proportion (a) in the range (x,1) for a given clinical attack rate x.
Asymptomatic cases cannot be identified and treated, nor can
their contacts be provided with prophylaxis. Figure 1 shows a
schematic of the basic model structure.
While it appears reasonable to assume that asymptomatic
individuals are less infectious than those with rhinorrhea, sneezing
and coughing, ‘off-season’ transmission of influenza within
households has been reported, without illness [19]. The absence
of data from which to estimate the relative infectiousness of
subclinical influenza is apparent from published models, in which
parameter assignments range anywhere from zero [7] to one tenth
[4] [8], to effectively double [5] that of clinical infections. We
approach this issue by investigating the impact of the relative
infectiousness of subclinical infections (x) in the range (0,1) on
model dynamics and the effectiveness of interventions.
Incorporation of resistant strains – characterisation of
behaviour relative to wild type
The emergence of antiviral-resistant strains is characterised by a
‘seeding’ parameter (r) explored across the range (10
24,1 0
21).
This parameter describes the proportion of hosts initially infected
with wild-type virus who, as a result of within-host selective
pressure exerted by antiviral agents, become predominantly
infected with, and transmit, resistant viruses. As earlier initiation
of drug therapy is likely to result in greater suppression of viral
growth, we assume with others [6,7] that the probability of seeding
resistance by prophylaxis (rp) is 10-fold smaller than by treatment
(rt). The transmission fitness of mutant strains relative to wild type
is described by an additional parameter (w). We assume that
asymptomatic infection occurs in equal proportions for resistant
and wild type strains, as we propose that this fraction is primarily
influenced by the distribution of prior immunity in the host
population resulting from past virus exposure. Asymptomatic
infections for both wild-type and resistant strains are assumed to
be x times as transmissible as symptomatic infections.
The model allows distinct parameterisation of resistant strain
seeding rates and fitness under selective pressure imposed by two
antiviral drugs. Given high rates of spontaneous resistance of
influenza virus strains against the adamantane class, the modelled
drugs may be considered as the neuraminidase inhibitors (NAIs)
oseltamivir and zanamivir. While there are fewer case reports of
zanamivir [27] than oseltamivir resistance in the literature,
insufficient data exist to inform the likely resistance profile of
influenza strains following widespread use of these agents. In the
absence of such data, we have assigned equivalent seeding and
fitness parameters for both strains in the present study.
Strategic drug use to minimise emergence/impact of
resistance
Targeted antiviral prophylaxis may be distributed to a
proportion (e) of contacts of symptomatic infectives, reducing
susceptibility to infection (es) [28] [29]. Where breakthrough
infection occurs, reduced infectiousness is assumed (ei), consistent
with the finding of marked reduction in influenza virus shedding
with prompt antiviral therapy [30]. Providing treatment within
48 hours of symptom onset to a proportion (y) of cases arising in
the absence of prophylaxis also reduces infectiousness (et) [28] [29].
We compare plausible ways in which one or two finite NAI drug
stockpiles could be deployed for treatment and prophylaxis in a
pandemic scenario. Two summary measures are used to compare
the effectiveness of alternative strategies: (a) Emergence of
resistance is measured using the cumulative proportion of all
strains resistant to one or both drugs, as a function of time (b) The
impact of mutant strains on outbreak dynamics is assessed by the
time to reach half of the final attack rate (tmed). The latter measure
is more robust than time to epidemic peak, when multiple peaks
are observed.
Antiviral Drug Resistance
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drug by comparing effects of treatment of symptomatic cases,
prophylaxis of close contacts and a combination of both. We then
extend this analysis to the optimal allocation of a stockpile
containing two drugs (in variable proportions) within a combined
treatment and prophylaxis strategy as follows:
(i) random distribution, limited only by the proportion of
each drug remaining in the stockpile at any point in time,
(ii) periodic drug cycling over a range of frequencies,
(iii) use of one drug for treatment only and the other for
prophylaxis of close contacts.
Under all strategies, the total number of antiviral courses available
is fixed at 44% of the population size, consistent with per capita
estimates of the Australian antiviral stockpile at the end of 2006.
Strains resistant to one drug are assumed to be sensitive to the
alternative agent, although sequential development of multi-drug
resistance may occur. We do not allow for reversion of resistant
strains to wild type in the absence of ongoing selective pressure from
antiviral drugs. Modifications to the one-drug model required to
implement these strategies are described in detail in Appendix S1.
Results
Asymptomatic infection
Figure 2a) demonstrates the relationship between a and R0 in
the absence of drug resistance. For a fixed clinical attack rate of
40%, a decrease in the proportion of symptomatic infections (ie
lower a) is consistent with a greater reproductive number and
serological attack rate. Consequently, both the time from the first
observed case to tmed and the delay induced by interventions are
reduced. Consistent with our earlier work [1], treating 40% of
symptomatic cases (y=0.4) has less effect on the spread of
infection than providing prophylaxis to 30% of their contacts
(e=0.3), and strategies that combine the two approaches are
optimal, across the full range of a. The change in effectiveness of a
combined intervention as the asymptomatic proportion varies is
demonstrated in Figure 2b). For a 50% asymptomatic infection
rate, the epidemic is largely uncontrolled. As the asymptomatic
fraction falls, transmission is constrained until stockpile expiry, at
which point an explosive outbreak occurs.
Resistant virus behaviour
We now allow for the possibility of emergence of a resistant
virus strain arising at a relatively high rate (rt=10
21, rp=10
22)i n
the presence of a single antiviral drug used according to the
combined treatment (40%) and prophylaxis (30%) strategy. The
transmissibility, w, of this strain relative to the uncontrolled wild
type virus is a key driver of the cumulative proportion of all
infections that are resistant, measured at the time of stockpile
expiry. A clear threshold effect is observed as a ‘cliff-edge’ in the
region of 70–90% relative transmissibility in the surface and
contour plots (Figures 3a and b). Resistance is further influenced
by the asymptomatic proportion, becoming more prevalent for
higher assumed values of a where a larger fraction of infections are
Figure 1. Model schematic. Simplified schematic of the model in the case of no resistance. In the steady state a proportion, e, of contacts of
symptomatic cases who are susceptible will have received prophylaxis (p subscript, above the dotted line). The remainder have not (np subscript,
below the dotted line). Those on prophylaxis have a reduced susceptibility es. For details refer to [1]. A proportion, y, of symptomatic infections that
were not provided with prophylaxis receive treatment. For clarity, we have not shown the progression from the infectious (I, A) states to the
permanently recovered (R) states. The force of infection arises from the five states on the right. Relative to the Inp,nt state, the infectiousness of the Ip,
Ap, Inp,t and Anp states are reduced by the factors ei, eix, et and x respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002362.g001
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prophylaxis. Moreover, given the lower baseline R0, interventions
produce longer delays to tmed, allowing more time for propagation
of resistant strains before drug stockpile expiry.
The combined influence of the rate of resistance emergence and
the relative fitness of mutant strains on epidemic dynamics is
demonstrated in Figure 4. Graphs a), b) and c) depict outbreak
curves for assumed values of the symptomatic proportion of 50, 60
and 70% respectively. In each of these scenarios, epidemic curves
are shown at baseline (no intervention), and with a combined
treatment (40%) and prophylaxis (30%) strategy in the absence of
antiviral resistance. Four possible combinations of resistant virus
characteristics are then explored in the intervention case – high
transmissibility (w=0.8) with high or low seeding, and low
transmissibility (w=0.3) with high or low seeding.
As before, a low symptomatic infection rate (50%) results in an
essentially uncontrolled epidemic at this level of intervention. With
an increase in the symptomatic proportion, greater delays are
achievable, and the properties of the resistant strain begin to have
a sizeable effect on timing. As Figure 4c) demonstrates, a ‘fit’
mutant arising at a high incidence rate dominates transmission
relative to the controlled wild-type virus, resulting in an earlier
onset but less explosive epidemic than observed in the absence of
resistance. Conversely, an unfit strain with a high seeding rate is
unable to propagate, effectively ‘immunising’ the population and
thus further delaying the wild type outbreak associated with
stockpile expiry.
Strategic use of two drugs
We now consider ways in which two NAIs with distinct
resistance profiles may be deployed in order to mitigate the
deleterious effects of a high fitness/high seeding resistant strain on
outbreak control. For continuity, we continue to deliver a
combined treatment (40%) and prophylaxis (30%) regimen. A
symptomatic fraction of 70% is assumed, as this allows the effects
of different interventions to be most clearly demonstrated. The
relative proportions of drugs in the stockpile are set at either 90/
10% or 50/50%.
Strategy 1: Random allocation. Drugs are randomly
distributed for either treatment or prophylaxis, as indicated,
depending on the proportions of Drug 1 and 2 in the stockpile.
With a 90/10% split, longer delays to tmed are achieved than in the
one drug scenario (Figure 5a). Resistance to the drug in greater
supply dominates the epidemic (Figure 6a) and multi-drug
resistance is rare (Figure 7a). Where relative drug proportions
are changed to 50/50%, a marginal increase in time to outbreak is
achieved (Figure 5b), at the cost of more multi-drug resistance
(Figure 7b).
Strategy 2: Drug cycling. Individual drugs are deployed in
the population over weeks or months, generally achieving greater
delays to tmed than in Strategy 1. Given the assumption of no cross-
resistance, a sizeable reduction in transmission occurs when Drug
2 is introduced in a population with a high prevalence of resistance
to Drug 1. As only one drug is in use for either treatment or
prophylaxis at any point in time, multi-drug resistance cannot
develop in this scenario before the second antiviral agent is
distributed. It should be noted, however, that the periodic
perturbations induced by drug switching may result in highly
complex behaviour, with unpredictable and frequently
unfavourable consequences for outbreak control. Such outputs
are examined in detail in the Appendix S1 – key summary points
are as follows:
1. Where cycle length is sufficiently long to allow depletion of one
or other drug before switching and the stockpile is asymmetric,
the drug in shorter supply should be used first. This is because
the lesser quantity is unlikely to last long in the later phases of
an exponentially growing epidemic (Figure 8a).
Figure 2. The influence of asymptomatic infection. Time of median infection as a function of the symptomatic proportion for a fixed clinical
attack rate of 40%. No intervention (black (y=0.0, e=0.0)), treatment only (red (y=0.4, e=0.0)), prophylaxis only (green (y=0.0, e=0.3)) and
combined treatment and prophylaxis (blue (y=0.4, e=0.3)). b. Epidemic curves for the combined intervention case in Figure 2a, for a=0.5 (solid),
a=0.6 (dashed) and a=0.7 (dot-dashed). For a severe epidemic (low a, high R0) the intervention is ineffective. For a mild epidemic (high a, low R0) the
intervention prevents most transmission until the stockpile expires at which point the epidemic takes off quickly. Stockpile expiry occurs at the kink in
the epidemic curve for a=0.7.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002362.g002
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generally delays the time to half the final attack rate as multi-
drug resistance cannot emerge until the second drug is used.
However, if the length of the first drug cycle is too great, single-
drug resistance reaches such high prevalence that therapeutic
efficacy declines (Figure 8b). Such wastage of the finite stockpile
ultimately results in less effective containment than Strategy 1.
3. Perturbations induced by drug switching may in some instances
result in a substantially shorter time to the median case than
random drug allocation. The exquisite sensitivity of this
behaviour to unknown (and unmeasurable) parameter assign-
ments is demonstrated by Figure 8c) which plots the time to
half the final attack rate against cycling period using a 50/50%
stockpile for resistant virus strains of variable fitness. Divergent
Figure 3. The proportion of cumulative infections that is resistant. a. Surface plot of the proportion of the total cumulative infections that
are resistant, at the point of stockpile expiry. The transition (‘‘cliff-edge’’) from a low-transmissible to high-transmissible resistant strain occurs at
w<0.7. As a increases (R0 decreases) the wild-type strain is less transmissible, the intervention is more effective, and thus the resistant strain is more
capable of dominating transmission. b. Contour plot as for Figure 3a.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002362.g003
Figure 4. The impact of seeding and fitness on viral dynamics. Epidemic curves. No intervention (solid black), no resistance (dashed black),
high fitness (blue) with high seeding (solid) and low seeding (dashed) and low fitness (red) with high seeding (solid) and low seeding (dashed). a.
Epidemic curves for high/low seeding and high/low fitness and a=0.5. The intervention has a marginal effect for all combinations of resistant virus
strain properties. b. Epidemic curves for high/low seeding and high/low fitness and a=0.6. The intervention has a small effect. High fitness resistant
strains (blue) result in a marginally shorter time to epidemic peak than in the case of a low fitness resistant strain or no emergence of resistant strains.
c. Epidemic curves for high/low seeding and high/low fitness and a=0.7. The intervention has a significant impact on the dynamics. For high fitness
(blue), the resistant strain can dominate and dramatically lessen the time to epidemic peak. For low fitness, the epidemic is well controlled until
stockpile expiry. A high seeding rate (solid red) provides an ‘‘immunising effect’’ which results in a dramatic delay in time to median infection.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002362.g004
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transmission parameter assignments (Range w=0.8, 0.9).
Strategy 3: Separate drugs for prophylaxis and
treatment. Results from the single drug combined
intervention strategy demonstrate that more than 90% of the
stockpile is deployed for prophylaxis, and the remainder for
treatment (data not shown). The allocation of a 90/10% drug
stockpile is thus limited to using the drug in greater supply for
prophylaxis and the alternative for treatment. Onset of drug
resistance occurs later than in other scenarios (Figure 6a), but is
dominated by multi-drug resistant strains (Figure 7a). In
consequence, this strategy provides the longest achievable delays
to tmed of all interventions explored (Figure 5a).
When the stockpile is symmetric (50/50%), the absolute number
of antiviral doses available for prophylaxis is substantially reduced.
However, no apparent difference in resistance emergence
(Figure 6b), 7b)) or epidemic timing (Figure 5b)) results from this
reduced supply for prophylaxis. As we have previously demon-
strated, drug delivery mirrors epidemic growth, which is
exponential [1]. It follows that, in the absence of logistic
constraints, a substantial proportion of the stockpile will be
distributed in a relatively short timeframe immediately prior to
depletion. Conversely, doubling the stockpile may control the
Figure 5. Strategic use of one or two drugs: epidemic curves. a. Epidemic curves for no intervention (black), a single drug strategy (blue), a
random allocation strategy (red) and a T&P strategy (green) for a 90/10 stockpile. The T&P strategy provides the longest time to median infection. b.
As for Figure 5a but with a 50/50 stockpile.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002362.g005
Figure 6. Strategic use of one or two drugs: cumulative infections. a. Cumulative infections for a 90/10 stockpile. Colours as in Figure 5a. The
solid line is total infections. The dotted line is resistant infections (single-drug and multi-drug resistant). All interventions result in a reduced attack
rate. The T&P strategy has a measurably reduced proportion of resistant infections and thus, at stockpile expiry, the wild-type strain dominates,
resulting in the highest overall attack rate (but the longest delay). b. As for Figure 6a but with a 50/50 stockpile.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002362.g006
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50% scenario, a proportion of the treatment stockpile remains
unused at the end of the epidemic.
Sensitivity analysis
Only the key results are described here: an extensive sensitivity
analysis of relevant parameters characterising the virus and
interventions is provided in Appendix S1. It is worth noting that,
for the two drug models, qualitative conclusions regarding the
relative benefits of alternative strategies might change where the
assumption of equivalent drug efficacy is allowed to vary.
Discussion
Our results demonstrate that the asymptomatic proportion of
infections is a critical determinant of the ability to constrain an
outbreak with a fixed level of interventions. When the epidemic is
controllable, antiviral distribution strategies that combine treat-
ment and prophylaxis result in the greatest reduction in virus
transmission, with the longest achievable delays to the median
case. In the context of ‘buying time’ for development and
deployment of a targeted vaccine, this is a desirable strategy.
The cost from this combined intervention is that it also leads to the
highest rates of resistant infections. This is not surprising, as
treatment favours the emergence of resistance in our model, while
prophylaxis provides selective advantage for propagation of
mutant strains in the host population.
This synergistic promotion of resistance can be curtailed by the
provision of different antiviral drugs with distinct resistance
profiles. In particular, if separate drugs are used for treatment
and prophylaxis, the chain of transmission of resistant viruses is
broken, prolonging effectiveness of the intervention. While cycling
Figure 7. Strategic use of one or two drugs: the resistant proportion. a. Proportion of cumulative infections that are resistant for a 90/10
stockpile. Colours as in Figure 5a. Solid lines are all resistant strains (single-drug and multi-drug resistant). Dashed lines are multi-drug resistant strains
only. Random allocation (red) is dominated by single-drug strain resistance. T&P (green) is dominated by multi-drug strain resistance, but as a
proportion of all infections, there is less resistance overall. b. As for Figure 7a but for a 50/50 stockpile. Both random allocation (red) and T&P
strategies (green) are dominated by multi-drug strain resistance. The T&P strategy has less resistance overall.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002362.g007
Figure 8. Analysis of the two drug cycling strategy. a. Epidemic curves with a 90/10 stockpile, for random allocation (black), using the 90%
stockpile first (blue) and using the 10% stockpile first (red). Using the 90% stockpile first results in a poor outcome. Using the 10% stockpile first
results in a slightly improved outcome compared to a random allocation strategy. b. Time to median infection (tmed) vs cycling period for a 90/10
stockpile. The 90% drug is used first. If the switch is not made soon enough, the time to median infection drops below the time in a random
allocation strategy. c. Time to median infection (tmed) vs cycling period for a 50/50 stockpile. From top to bottom, the fitness of the resistant strain(s)
is subtly increasing (w=0.8, 0.81, 0.83, 0.85, 0.9). As the cycling period increases, the delay increases until a threshold is reached. Beyond the threshold
the time to median infection may be greater than or less than the time for a random allocation strategy (cycling period approaching zero).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002362.g008
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be advantageous in some instances, benefit cannot be consistently
predicted.
A particular strength of our approach is the use of dynamic
‘contact’ variables [1], which enable simulation of targeted drug
distribution and stockpile depletion in a large population. In
consequence, we can consider the implications of one or two finite
stockpiles expiring, which include resurgence of wild-type
infections following drug depletion, with consequences for the
final cumulative proportion of all infections that are resistant.
It should be noted that our use of a deterministic model has the
usual limitations. The inherently stochastic nature of the epidemic
in its early stages, and the initial seeding of a drug resistant strain,
cannot be accounted for accurately. The dynamics of the
established epidemic however should be well captured.
The characterisation of resistance in the model was subject to
several simplifying assumptions. Firstly, we assumed that resistance
arose only within human hosts receiving antiviral therapy. Recent
surveillance for neuraminidase inhibitor resistance in influenza
viruses has detected spontaneous mutations conferring reduced
drug sensitivity, in isolates from regions where use of antiviral
agents is rare [31] [32] [33]. Evidence of oseltamivir persistence in
treated waste-water and the prophylactic use of antiviral agents in
poultry production also raises the potential for resistance selection
in avian populations, prior to introduction to human hosts [34].
These observations could invalidate our baseline assumption of
fully sensitive strains.
We further assume that a host who becomes infected with a
resistant virus will continue to propagate such a strain, even if they
do not receive antiviral drugs themselves. While within-host
reversion to wild-type may well occur in the absence of selective
pressure, this becomes less likely for strains with little biological
impairment [35]. On balance, we therefore felt it most
conservative to disregard this possibility in order to explore the
worst-case scenario of rapid development of multi-drug resistance.
If resistance to one drug also conferred resistance to the other, our
two-drug model would effectively reduce to the single-drug case.
The transmission potential of an emergent pandemic influenza
strain is subject to debate. Even more uncertain is the likely rate of
emergence and fitness of resistant strains in the setting of wide-
scale use of antiviral agents. Resistant mutants, where reported in
animal experiments, have generally exhibited markedly reduced
transmissibility [36]. Mutant viruses have been detected in up to
18% of paediatric subjects treated with oseltamivir in clinical trials
[37]. The low prevalence of oseltamivir resistance in Japan [38],
where this drug has been used extensively, has provided some
reassurance that such strains are not well propagated. However,
more recent NAI resistance surveillance data from the United
States [32] and Europe [33] have highlighted the emergence of
mutants that appear to be readily transmissible between humans.
The H274Y mutation, identified in 14% of 437 European strains
(70% of Norwegian strains) between November 2007 and January
2008, is associated with a 400-fold reduction in susceptibility to
oseltamivir. None of these mutant isolates appear to have been
taken from treated individuals, making it most likely that they are
readily transmissible between humans [39]. Given such wide
diversity of observations, we have therefore aimed to characterise
the full spectrum of behaviours of wild type and resistant virus that
might be observed within a flexible model framework.
In the main text, we have concentrated on a few key examples
but discuss a wider range of scenarios in Appendix S1. For
example, we show that more rapidly growing epidemics (those
with a higher asymptomatic proportion) may be well controlled by
applying increased levels of intervention, within the limits of
feasibility. We have deliberately chosen more modest levels of drug
distribution, which might be achievable in a public health
emergency. Further, we show that strains with higher transmis-
sibility may be constrained if a corresponding reduction in seeding
rate is assigned. The relative advantage of alternative drug
strategies is not altered by changes to these assumptions.
Variation in strain behaviour could also influence the efficacy of
antiviral agents at the individual host level. Recent work in ferrets
has shown marked differences in the virulence potential of H5N1
influenza viruses arising from distinct clades. Earlier treatment
onset, higher daily dosages and a longer course of oseltamivir were
required to prevent morbidity and mortality among ferrets
infected with the more virulent strain [40]. Inadequate dosing is
also more likely to favour the emergence of drug resistance [40],
but as the optimal recommendations and compliance in a
pandemic situation are purely speculative at present, we have
not attempted to characterise this phenomenon within the model.
Population heterogeneity, which we have not incorporated, could
impact on antiviral interventions in several ways. For example, a
recent study has demonstrated more persistent virus shedding 4–
6 days after initiation of oseltamivir therapy among children than
adults [41], consistent with earlier findings [37]. This observation
supports the development of age-dependent parameter assign-
ments to characterise treatment efficacy, and corresponding rates
of resistance emergence among the paediatric population.
Several published models have explored the issue of antiviral
resistance induced by drug selection pressure. Within small
populations, drugs may be distributed to a large proportion of
the susceptible pool at once to good effect [4] [10], but such an
intervention is not realistically achievable on a larger scale [6].
While Debarre’s metapopulation model extended on earlier work
to consider the impact of large-scale population structure on
epidemic dynamics, prophylaxis was still uniformly distributed at a
fixed point in time [8]. Moghadas derived optimal treatment levels
for minimising the impact of drug resistance by considering the
mutation process in more detail, but did not account for
prophylaxis [42]. Ferguson introduced the notion of a ‘contact’
pool in order to target antiviral prophylaxis, but assumed only two
contacts per infectious individual, both drawn from the susceptible
class [5]. As we have previously demonstrated, underestimating
the number of contacts in this manner may over-estimate the
effectiveness of the intervention [1]. Lipsitch allowed for more
targeted effects of interventions by considering that a fraction of
exposed susceptible hosts had received prophylaxis, with variable
efficacy against infection and clinical disease [7]. In contrast to our
model, however, no constraint was placed on the number of doses
available, resulting in drug availability throughout the entire
course of the epidemic. Among other consequences, this lack of
constraint facilitated the eventual emergence of resistant strain
outbreaks [7].
Where asymptomatic infections make a large contribution to
disease transmission, as in Ferguson’s seasonal influenza model, a
relatively small proportion of all infected cases and their contacts
receive antivirals, making emergence of resistance less likely [5].
Conversely, when R0 is reduced, either by increasing the
symptomatic proportion or through social distancing measures
[7] including population fragmentation [8], the proportion of
resistant virus strains increases due to the prolonged duration of
the epidemic. Further, in larger populations where there is more
time for propagation of resistant strains to occur, prophylaxis
consistently favours emergence of mutant strains, with dynamic
consequences contingent on fitness. Mutants with fitness above a
definable but steep threshold are likely to predominate early under
drug selective pressure [7]. When resistant viruses are poorly
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to outbreak [7]. Within the time constraints of an outbreak
occurring within a small susceptible pool, treatment may be more
potent at inducing resistance than prophylaxis [4] [10], depending
on the relative fitness and seeding rate assigned to emergent drug-
resistant viruses [6].
Combined prophylaxis and treatment strategies offer improved
prospects for containment of epidemic growth using antiviral
agents in the event of an influenza outbreak. While resistance
emergence is more likely within such a strategy, the implications
for epidemic control are strongly dependent on the relative fitness
of mutant strains, with the potential for either reduced or extended
delays to an uncontrolled outbreak. Where two drugs are
available, strategies that allocate different drugs to treated cases
and their close contacts are likely to be most effective at
constraining the rate of resistance emergence, thereby generally
increasing the time over which epidemic growth may be
contained.
We have demonstrated the critical importance of both the rate
of asymptomatic infection and relative transmissibility of an
emergent drug-resistant influenza virus for model predictions
regarding pandemic control. Our work highlights the need for
information gathering regarding these parameters, as well as more
frequently described measures such as the clinical attack rate, to
optimise the predictive capacity of models for use as decision
support tools in the event of a pandemic.
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